On the uniqueness of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium for all N- firms
Elvio Accinelli Gamba y Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera
Resumen:
This paper shows tractable and easy conditions for attaining the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the Cournot oligopoly game with
N
firms where the cost functions are not necessarily quadratic and convex. The equilibrium is characterized in terms of best response (reaction) correspondence. The conditions assure that the reaction functions are a contraction mapping and they are not reduced to demand the well known conditions of concave games. However, the conditions are weaker as the number of firms increases.
This paper shows tractable and easy conditions for attaining the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the Cournot oligopoly game with
N
firms where the cost functions are not necessarily quadratic and convex. The equilibrium is characterized in terms of best response (reaction) correspondence. The conditions assure that the reaction functions are a contraction mapping and they are not reduced to demand the well known conditions of concave games. However, the conditions are weaker as the number of firms increases.
Keywords:
best response, contraction theorem, implicit function, reaction function, uniqueness
Como citar este artículo
Elvio Accinelli Gamba y Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera
On the uniqueness of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium for all N- firms
Revista Mexicana de Economía Agrícola y de los Recursos Naturales, Año: 2009, Vol. 2, Núm. 3, julio-diciembre, pp. 126-134
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